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NOTES
TAX CONSEQUENCES OF WITHDRAWAL FROM A
TWO MAN PARTNERSHIP: SALE
OR LIQUIDATION?
The tax treatment of payments to a withdrawing member of a
partnership depends on whether the payment is classified as a liquida-
tion or a sale. Recent litigation underscores the necessity to consider
further the problem of distinguishing a sale from a liquidation, espe-
cially where the withdrawal is from a two man partnership. The theo-
retical basis for the present statutory framework also merits reexami-
nation.
A liquidation' payment made by the partnership for the with-
drawing partner's entire partnership interest 2 is subject to taxation
under section 736.3 Liquidation payments are divided into two catego-
ries: subsection (b) payments for the withdrawing partner's interest in
1 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 761(d) [hereinafter cited as CODE] reads in pertinent part
as follows:
[T]he term "liquidation of a partner's interest" means the termination of a
partner's entire interest in a partnership by means of a distribution, or a series
of distributions, to the partner by the partnership.
2 Treas. Reg. § 1.736-1(a)(1)(i) (1956) states that the liquidation section applies only
to payments made by the partnership and not to transactions between the partners. The
interest in the partnership includes physical assets, cash, and inventory. Good will may
be included if the agreement so provides. CODE § 736(b)(2)(B).
3 CODE § 736 reads as follows:
(a) PAYMENTS CONSImEDE AS DiSTsIUvE SHARE OR GUARANTEED PAYmENT.-
Payments made in liquidation of the interest of a retiring partner or a deceased
partner shall, except as provided in subsection (b), be considered-
(1) as a distributive share to the recipient of partnership income if the
amount thereof is determined with regard to the income of the partner-
ship, or
(2) as a guaranteed payment described in section 707(c) if the amount thereof
is determined without regard to the income of the partnership.
(b) PAYMENTS FOR INTEREST IN PARTNERSHIP-
(1) General Rule.-Payments made in liquidation of the interest of a retir-
ing partner or a deceased partner shall, to the extent such payments
(other than payments described in paragraph (2)) are determined, under
regulations prescribed by the Secretary or his delegate, to be made in ex-
change for the interest of such partner in partnership property, be con-
sidered as a distribution by the partnership and not as a distributive
share or guaranteed payment under subsection (a).
(2) Special Rules.-For purposes of this subsection, payments in exchange
for an interest in partnership property shall not include amounts paid
(A) unrealized receivables of the partnership (as defined in sec-
tion 751(c)), or
(B) good will of the partnership, except to the extent that the
partnership agreement provides for a payment with respect
to good will.
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the partnership; and subsection (a) payments constituting any amount
not included under subsection (b).4 Subsection (b) payments receive
capital gains treatment, exclusive of payments representing unrealized
receivables and good will.5 Subsection (a) payments are considered
either distributive shares or guaranteed payments-ordinary income
to the withdrawing partner under sections 702 and 707(c), and a de-
ductible business expense to the partnership.
Section 741, relating to the sale or exchange of an interest in the
partnership,6 applies regardless of whether the purchaser is already a
member of the partnership.7 Proceeds from the sale are capital gains
to the transferor of the interest,8 and the payment is not a deductible
business expense to the purchaser. The amount paid for the withdraw-
ing partner's interest in unrealized receivables or substantially appre-
ciated inventory is excluded from section 741 and is treated as ordinary
income under section 751(a).
Thus when one partner withdraws from a partnership, he and the
remaining partners are given alternative means of allocating their re-
spective tax burdens. Problems arise when the withdrawing member
desires capital gains treatment, but the buyers wish to expense their
payment.
The distinction between a sale and a liquidation is crucial when
the tax burden imposed by the two sections is substantially different.
This occurs if the transaction is deemed a liquidation in which sub-
section (a) payments have been received. Theoretically, the key inquiry
is whether the purchaser is the partnership itself or the remaining part-
ner as an individual. In practice, however, making this distinction is
difficult because the two transactions are economically indistinguish-
able.9 In each case the same parties are involved, and the withdrawing
4 The recipient must designate the portion of the payment representing his interest
in the partnership property. Generally, the valuation placed upon the withdrawing
partner's interest will be regarded as correct. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.736-1(b)(1), (5) (1956).
5 CODE § 736(b)(2).
6 Id. § 741 states:
In the case of a sale or exchange of an interest in a partnership, gain or
loss shall be recognized to the transferor partner. Such gain or loss shall be con-
sidered as gain or loss from the sale or exchange of a capital asset, except as
otherwise provided in section 751 (relating to unrealized receivables and in-
ventory items which have appreciated substantially in value).
7 Treas. Reg. § 1.471-1(b) (1956).
8 CoDE § 731(a)(1) states that the gain shall be recognizable to the extent that any
money distributed exceeds the adjusted basis of such partner's interest in the partnership.
9 The only real distinction occurs in the event of partnership bankruptcy where the
partnership creditors (a liquidation situation) will rank ahead of the partner's creditors
(a sale situation). Cf. United States v. Kaufman, 267 U.S. 408, 412 (1925).
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partner receives roughly similar payments. Assets can easily be trans-
ferred between the partnership and the individual making the pay-
ment, giving one transaction the appearance of the other.
The government's revenue is similar under each classification.
Although a liquidation yields a larger tax payment than does a capital
gains tax on a sale, the larger payment is somewhat offset by the ex-
pense deduction taken by the partnership.10 Accordingly, the classifi-
cation of the transaction is likely to be immaterial to the government.
But since differing classifications may produce greatly disparate tax
burdens on the individuals, clear tests must be developed to differen-
tiate the two categories, thereby enabling the parties to order their
relationship with predictability.
I
SALE OR LIQUIDATION-THE LACK OF PREDICTABILITY
Distinguishing a sale from a liquidation is most complex in a two
man partnership. The first complicating factor is the possible inappli-
cability of the liquidation sections to the two man situation. Since a
liquidation is defined as the termination of a partner's entire interest
by means of a distribution to him by the partnership," the Code
implies a requirement of at least two remaining partners. Also, under
the law of most states, withdrawal of one of two partners means that
no partnership survives. 12 If payments are not made by a partnership
surviving the transaction, there can be no section 736 liquidation. 8
In addition, section 708(b)(1)(A) states that a partnership will be con-
sidered terminated if no portion of the business is carried on by the
partners in a partnership.14 A strict reading of this section compels the
conclusion that liquidation is impossible in a two man partnership
when payments are made after one partner retires.15 Does this mean
10 Consequently, if there is a dispute as to whether a transaction is a sale or a liquida-
tion, the Commissioner will claim a liquidation with regard to the seller and a sale with
regard to the purchaser. If both parties are involved, with the transferor of the partner-
ship interest claiming a sale and the transferee claiming a liquidation, the Commissioner
will take inconsistent positions to protect revenue. See Miller v. United States, 67-2 U.S.
Tax Cas. 1 9685 (Ct. Cl. 1967); Charles F. Phillips, 40 T.C. 157 (1963). Thus, the real
contest is often between the withdrawing and the remaining partners to determine who
is to receive the more favorable tax treatment.
11 CODE § 761(d), quoted in note 1 supra.
12 See, e.g., UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP Act § 29.
13 Treas. Reg. § 1.736-1(a) (1956).
14 CODE § 708(b)(1)(A).
15 Swihart, Tax Problems Raised by Liquidations of Partnership Interests, 44 TExAs
L. REV. 1209, 1234 (1966).
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that two man partnerships receive tax treatment different from that
of larger partnerships? Because it seems unfair to condition an indi-
vidual's tax status solely on the number of his business associates, two
regulations have been promulgated to permit liquidation treatment
in the two man partnership situation. First, upon the death of one
member, the partnership will not be considered terminated if his estate
continues to share in the profits or losses of the partnership business.' 6
Second, a retiring partner receiving payments under section 736 is
considered a partner until his entire interest is liquidated.17
The validity of these regulations, however, is questionable. There
is no statutory authority for them; indeed they seem to contradict sec-
tion 708(b). The regulations also conflict with concepts of partnership
dissolution developed under state law.' 8 If a court decides to ignore
the regulations, finding a dissolution under the applicable state law,
the possibility of a liquidation is precluded. Such a result is unlikely,
however, because of the conceded irrelevance of state partnership law
to this area of federal income taxation. The regulations explicitly state
that termination of a partnership for federal income tax purposes is
not necessarily governed by local law,1
There are other difficulties in distinguishing a sale from a liquida-
tion in a two man partnership. There may be a tendency for the re-
maining partner to commingle his personal and business assets after
the dissolution. Thus, it may be difficult to determine whether pay-
ments are being made by the business or by the individual. In addi-
tion, other tests used to differentiate a sale from a liquidation are in-
applicable to the two man partnership situation.20
The problems of a two man partnership dissolution are most
graphically illustrated by two cases stemming from the same transac-
tion-Charles F. Phillips2' and Miller v. United States.2 2 The Phillips-
Miller partnership acted as a sales representative for sporting goods
manufacturers. When Phillips retired, Miller retained all partnership
assets and agreed to pay Phillips a percentage of the future income
received from their main partnership account.23 The payments thus
were being made after the partnership had been dissolved under state
16 Treas. Reg. § 1.708-1(b)(1)(i)(a) (1956).
17 Treas. Reg. § 1.736-1(a)(6) (1956).
18 See, e.g., UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP Acr § 29, stating that a partnership is dissolved
when any partner "ceas[es] to be associated in the carrying on ... of the business."
19 Treas. Reg. § 1.706-1(c)(1) (1956).
20 See pp. 443-45 infra.
21 40 T.C. 157 (1963).
22 67-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9685 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
23 40 T.C. at 158.
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law. Phillips claimed that the proceeds were capital gains, and the Tax
Court stressed three facts in upholding this contention: 24 the payments
were made by Miller out of his future earnings; Miller signed the
agreement as an individual; and the partnership ceased to exist before
the payments were made. The contradiction between its third reason
and the regulations was ignored by the court.25 Although the decision
turned on the fact that Miller had purchased as an individual, it indi-
cates that in some instances the regulations may be ignored, thereby
precluding a finding of liquidation. The applicability of section 736
to a two man dissolution will be severely limited if this result continues
to be the law. Prior to Phillips, the judicial tendency was to construe
a two man dissolution as a section 741 sale-perhaps covertly sub-
scribing to such a limitation.26
This tendency to find a sale has been reversed in recent years.
Ironically, the major decision supporting the liquidation regulation
involved the same transaction as the Phillips case. In Miller v. United
States,27 the continuing partner claimed a deduction under section
736(a) for the payments that Phillips had successfully treated as capital
gains three years earlier. The Court of Claims found a section 736
liquidation and specifically mentioned both the applicability of regu-
lation 1.736-1(a)(6) and the Phillips court's failure to consider it.28 The
court stressed that the language of the agreement, stating that the
partnership was dissolved and its assets distributed, indicated a lack of
intention for a sale. A few minor decisions previously had allowed
liquidation treatment in a two man situation,29 but Miller is the first
decision that clearly follows the regulation.
The Phillips-Miller dichotomy emphasizes the need for developing
predictable tests to determine whether a transaction is a sale or a liqui-
dation. The lack of clear standards fosters divergent results since each
side of a single transaction may be treated differently. This is logically
24 Id. at 160-61.
25 See Treas. Reg. § 1.736-1(a)(6) (1956).
26 See Karan v. Commissioner, 319 F.2d 303 (7th Cir. 1963); Kinney v. United States,
228 F. Supp. 656 (W.D. La. 1964), aff'd per curiam, 358 F.2d 738 (5th Cir. 1966). In lan-
guage somewhat more conclusory than convincing, both of these cases held that the
transactions involved were sales.
27 67-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9685 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
28 Id. at 85,302-04.
29 Andrew 0. Stilwell, 46 T.C. 247 (1966), found a liquidation, but since no continu-
ing payments were involved, the question of the validity of the regulation was not raised.
Finkelmeier v. United States, 66-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9152 (S.D. Ohio 1965), involved con-
tinuing payments to a widow of a deceased partner. A jury found a liquidation, thereby
supporting Treas. Reg. § 1.708-1(b)(1)(i)(a) (1956).
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unacceptable; the same transaction should not be a sale to one party
and a liquidation to the other, depriving the government of revenue
in both instances. Moreover, predictability is essential. The differing
tax consequences of each transaction require that the individuals be
given guidance as to where tax burdens will fall. The confusion created
by the Phillips-Miller split is compounded by the fact that divergent
lines of authority have been created. The Miller case arising in the
Court of Claims did not overrule the Tax Court holding in Phillips.
Consequently, a similar split could arise in the next disputed dissolu-
tion, and forum shopping will be encouraged.
II
TESTS TO DIFFERENTIATE SALES AND LIQUDATIONS
Several tests have been proposed to differentiate a sale from a
liquidation: 30 the economic consequences test, the maker-of-the-pay-
ments test, the source-of-the-payments test, the primary obligation test,
and the intent-of-the-parties test. No one test has been consistently
applied, nor have most courts clearly defined the criteria they deem
determinative. Indeed, the economic consequences test, defining a
transfer to all remaining partners on a pro rata basis as a liquidation,
has never been specifically applied. In a two man situation where the
remaining partner is the purchaser, this test would invariably create a
liquidation, since the distribution to the one remaining partner would
necessarily be pro rata. This result limits the available choice in a two
man partnership in a manner completely opposite that contemplated
by Phillips.
The most widely cited case on the sale-liquidation problem is
David A. Foxman.31 Two partners purchased the interest of a third
partner for a cash payment made by personal checks, a note in the
partnership name, a partnership automobile, and some personally
owned stock. The court, misapplying the primary obligation test,
found the partners personally bound under the contract and held the
transaction to be a section 741 sale.32 The fact that the partners were
only secondarily liable on the note was ignored. The Foxman result
is, however, compatible with section 761(d), which defines a liquidation
as the termination of a partner's entire interest by a partnership dis-
30 See Swihart, supra note 15, at 1225-26.
31 41 T.C. 535 (1964), aff'd, 352 F.2d 466 (Sd Cir. 1965).
32 Id. at 552.
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tribution. Thus the court may have implicitly relied on the fact that
part of the payment was the buyers' personal stock. 3 In William T.
Wheeling,34 the partners' individual liability as primary obligors was
again stressed in finding a section 741 sale. Because the contractual
liability went beyond the joint liability imposed by local partnership
law, it was held to create a new individual obligation.35
The primary obligation test may be unreliable since it emphasizes
form rather than substance.36 The party actually bound may not be
the one making the payments, and the form of the agreement may not
correspond to the parties' understanding of the tax consequences.
In Karan v. Commissioner,37 the court purported to look at the
source of the payment as the proper test, finding a sale on the ground
that the payment came from the remaining partner's personal funds.38
This conclusion was reinforced because the individual was bound on
a note for the purchase price. The source-of-the-payments test looks
more at the substance of a transaction than at its outward form. Since
the main statutory distinction between a sale and a liquidation is
whether payments are made by the partnership or by individuals, this
test may be the most realistic. Its major difficulty is the problem of
proving the source of the payment. If an advance cutoff date is used
to prevent pre-transaction transfers of assets, this problem is not in-
surmountable. 39
Fitzgerald Atkinson 40 found a sale based on the supposed inten-
tion of the parties. Since the agreement specifically said "sell," and
since partnership liquidation procedures were ignored, the court found
an intent to treat the transaction as a sale. The partnership was dis-
solved before the transaction was completed and a corporation was
formed to purchase Atkinson's assets. Although the correct decision
was reached, the court's reasoning was imperfect because there was no
actual partnership to be bound or to act as the source of the liquida-
tion payments. 41
33 Swihart, supra note 15, at 1231.
34 1964 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 64,128.
35 Id. at 862.
36 See 52 G~o. L.J. 651 (1964) for a note criticizing the Foxman decision on this basis.
37 319 F.2d 303 (7th Cir. 1963),
33 Id. at 306.
39 For example, this could be accomplished through a regulation stating that any
transfer of assets within two years of the agreement will be ignored for tax purposes.
40 1964 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 64,137.
41 Kinney v. United States, 228 F. Supp. 656 (W.D. La. 1964), a4'd per curiam, 358
F.2d 738 (5th Cir. 1966), involved a similar situation where a corporation was formed from
a two man partnership with the remaining partner purchasing all the corporate stock.
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Since the statutory framework gives the partners a choice in cast-
ing their transaction, intent should be determinative. But three prac-
tical problems minimize the utility of this test: (1) the parties, if unable
to agree on the tax consequences, may purposely draw a vague agree-
ment and take their chances in court; (2) the partners may be poorly
informed, inadvertently hiding their intentions in vague language; and
(3) the parties may be completely unaware of the tax consequences and
thus have no specific intent with regard to the manner of taxation.
Consequently, intent may best serve as an ancillary rather than a pri-
mary test.
The maker-of-the-payments test is similar to the primary obliga-
tion test in its emphasis on form over substance. The test may be in-
accurate since the party making a payment is not necessarily the source
of the funds. In a two man situation, it is difficult to call the partner-
ship the maker of the payment since the partnership exists only by
virtue of a treasury regulation.42 Further, a source test is more logical
here since the assets of the former partnership are likely to be the
actual source of the funds.
Although analysis of the relatively few decisions on the sale-
liquidation problem reveals that no one test has been consistently ap-
plied, two underlying factors are crucial: (1) the source of the payment,
and (2) the language of the agreement which defines the obligor. Most
cases would reach the same result if these factors were deemed deter-
minative. The major exception would be the Phillips-Miller dichotomy
which is complicated by the problem of regulation 1.736-1(a)(6).
III
FLEXIBLE TAX PLANNING-MORE ILLUSORY THAN REAL
The partnership amendments to the Internal Revenue Code of
1954 reflect Congress' desire to introduce greater simplicity, flexibility,
and equity into partnership taxation law.43 Presumably, the tax burden
on dissolution is to be allocated by the partners bargaining at arms'
length. The partnership sections afford tax options roughly similar to
the corporate sections. A section 741 sale is analogous to a shareholder's
A sale was found through rather confused reasoning which equated a liquidation with a
dissolution. Id. at 661-63. However, an application of the source-of-the-payments test
would have produced a similar result. An intent test was also applied in Bolling v. Patter-
son, 61-1 U.S. Tax Gas. 9417 (N.D. Ala. 1961).
42 Treas. Reg. § 1.736-1(a)(6) (1956).
43 Miller v. United States, 67-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9685, at 85,301 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
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sale of his stock to a third party, both receiving capital gains treatment.
A section 736 liquidation is analogous to stock sales to the corpora-
tion where, as in section 736, the distribution is either ordinary income
or a capital gain, depending on whether it is classified as a dividend 44
a liquidation,45 or a redemption.4
Unfortunately, as the Phillips-Miller split demonstrates, this flex-
ible approach has undermined the predictability of the tax conse-
quences of partnership dissolution.47 If the language of the agreement
is sufficiently boiler-plated, indicating a clear choice of one alternative,
and if payment is made out of the corresponding source, the result is
fairly predictable.48 The danger remains, however, that regulation
1.736-1(a)(6) may be ignored, thereby defeating the partners' intent.
The degree of predictability further decreases as the transaction moves
away from a precisely worded agreement. Because of the dangers of a
Phillips result and the possibility that the partners' intent is not dis-
cernible, the flexible framework must be reexamined to determine
whether it accomplishes any worthwhile purpose.
By assuming the tax consequences of a transaction, a party, in
effect, agrees to pay more for the purchase or to receive less for the
sale of his partnership interest. It would be unrealistic to assume that
this differential is not reflected in the purchase price. A vendor sells
for less if he knows that he will be taxed at the lower capital gains
rates rather than at ordinary income rates. The vendee pays more if he
can deduct part of the purchase price from ordinary income. In each
case, the price paid is the fair market value of the seller's interest, but
this fair market value varies with the tax consequences of the trans-
action. The net economic result of a sale or a liquidation is the same;
the only difference is the size of the check that each party writes to
the government. The economic consequences are significant only when
one party is unaware of the tax variable, when both parties are un-
aware, or when a court reaches an unpredictable result. Thus a tax
44 A dividend is defined in CODE § 316 and is treated as ordinary income under
§ 61(a)(7).
45 Liquidations are defined in CODE § 346 and are given capital gains treatment under
§ 331.
46 A redemption is defined in CODE § 317(b) and is given capital treatment if the
requirements of § 302(b) are met.
47 The Foxman court stated that the attempt at simplicity and predictability has
failed. 41 T.C. at 551.
48 For discussions of how to achieve the desired results, see Hewitt, How to Tailor
Partnership Buy-out Agreements for Desired Tax Effects, 23 J. TAXATION 168 (1965);
Lewis, Tax Aspects of Sale or Termination of a Partnership Interest, 45 TAxEs 324 (1967).
See also Swihart, supra note 15, at 1250-52.
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structure developed to permit flexible tax planning actually produces
economic differentials only when the results are unplanned.
CONCLUSION
The solution to this dilemma is two-fold: (1) Decrease the number
of cases where the results are unplanned; and (2) subject all unplanned
cases to equal tax treatment. The source-of-the-payments test appears
to be the most accurate of the judicially formulated tests, because it
looks beyond the form of the agreement to determine the actual deriva-
tion of the purchase price.49 The selection and consistent application
of this test would increase predictability in cases where planning was
attempted and would provide consistent results where the tax conse-
quences were unplanned. This approach, however, would be merely a
stopgap measure.
A more permanent result might be achieved by amending the
regulations to classify as a section 736 liquidation all dissolutions where
the remaining partners purchase pro rata.50 This need not destroy
whatever flexible tax planning is available under present law. It is still
possible to achieve increased capital gains treatment within section 736
by stipulating that part of the payment is for good will.51 Thus some
flexibility is present, even if liquidation is the only available alterna-
tive. Mandatory use of section 736 means that payments for a partner-
ship interest will be given capital gains treatment,52 but distributive
shares and guaranteed payments will be taxed as ordinary income.53
This corresponds to corporate taxation principles; income distributions
(dividends) and capital distributions (liquidations or redemptions) are
taxed at different rates. It also alleviates the problem of unpredictabil-
ity which results from a flexible tax program that, in reality, has accom-
plished nothing.
Robert E. Madden
49 See pp. 443-45 supra.
50 See H.R. 9662, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. § 201 (1960). The Senate Finance Committee
recommended a similar result in a proposed amendment to this bill. See S. R P. No. 1616,
86th Cong., 2d Sess. 103-04 (1960). Swihart recommended this as a solution to the problem
of distinguishing sales from liquidations. Swihart, supra note 15, at 1240.
51 CODE § 736(b)(2)(B).
52 Id. § 736(b).
53 Id. § 736(a).
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